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DRONE WARFARE AND JUST WAR THEORY 
Harry van der Linden 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have been used by the United States in 
conventional war situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, but their most controversial purpose 
has been their use, especially by the Obama administration, in the targeted killing of suspected terrorists 
outside declared or legally recognized war zones, such as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) in Pakistan and Yemen.1 Targeted killing of civilian “militants” can also take place through cruise 
missile strikes, manned aircrafts, and “boots on the ground” (as is illustrated by the killing of Osama bin 
Laden), but targeted killing by drones has several distinct advantages for the United States.  
Unlike targeted killing executed by counterinsurgency troops, drone targeted killing poses few risks to 
the lives of US soldiers because the teams that launch and recover drones are typically hundreds of miles 
away from the search and strike area, while the teams that fly the plane (consisting of a pilot and a 
sensor operator controlling the cameras), together with their supporting teams of data analysts, etc., are 
thousands of miles away in the United States, watching or searching for their target until the optimal 
moment has arrived to unleash the missiles. Moreover, drones are considerably cheaper strike platforms 
than manned aircrafts and can stay in the air much longer (over twenty hours). And, like cruise missiles, 
drones do not turn the target area into a battlefield where humans face one another as enemies, but they 
are superior to cruise missiles in terms of a much shorter strike time so that the killing can be executed on 
the basis of a last-moment assessment of the intended target.2 Accordingly, it not surprising that most US 
targeted killings have been executed by remote-controlled aircraft.  
The targeted killings by the Obama administration show that drones enable war to be fought in a 
fundamentally new way. My main aim here is to argue that drone warfare poses moral problems and risks 
of such nature and magnitude that we should support an international ban on weaponized drones and, 
certainly, that we should seek an international treaty against drone systems that operate without the 
remote-control link; namely, autonomous, lethal UAVs (and killer robots in general). My argument will 
develop in two steps.  
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First, I will articulate some moral objections to drone warfare on the basis of a just war theory analysis 
of the Obama administration’s targeted killings. To make my analysis manageable, I will focus on the CIA-
led drone campaign in Pakistan, as it was stepped up by the Obama administration in 2009, peaked in 
2010 with 128 strikes and 751 to 1,108 humans killed, including 87-197 civilians, slowed down in 2013 
with 27 strikes, and as it was scaled down in 2015 and 2016 (through September 1) with 13 and 3 strikes, 
respectively.3  
Second, I will explore some additional moral objections to combat drones on the basis of principles of 
“just military preparedness” or jus ante bellum (justice before war), a new category of just war thinking. 
Let me begin by introducing traditional just war theory and its normative principles.  
JUST WAR THEORY 
Just war theory consists of a historically evolved set of normative principles for determining when resort to 
military force is just (jus ad bellum principles) and how war can be justly executed (jus in bello principles). 
The most important jus ad bellum principle is that war must have a just cause, i.e., a goal of a kind and 
weight that seems to make resort to military force appropriate. Further, war must be declared by a 
legitimate or right authority, and must be pursued with right intention or the just cause as its primary 
motive. The three final jus ad bellum principles are that war must be a last-resort measure (diplomacy and 
other nonviolent measures should generally be pursued first); that it must have a reasonable chance of 
success in realizing its intended goal; and that it must be proportional in the sense that the anticipated 
goods of militarily pursuing the just cause must be commensurate with the expected harms.  
The most essential jus in bello principle is the principle of discrimination, or noncombatant immunity, 
which requires that combatants distinguish between civilians and enemy combatants, and only directly 
attack the latter. Unintended civilian deaths are permitted, but due care must be taken to minimize their 
number, and the military value of the target must make it worth the cost of civilian life. There is also a 
separate jus in bello principle of micro-proportionality, stipulating that military force should be used 
economically in that the anticipated harms of a military action should not be excessive in proportion to its 
military value. Traditionally, the jus ad bellum decision was seen as chiefly the responsibility of political 
leaders, while using force in accordance with the jus in bello principles fell on the shoulders of soldiers. But 
in a modern democracy this seems no longer tenable: war in all its aspects has also become the 
responsibility of the citizens, and, arguably, a volunteer army entails that soldiers also have jus ad bellum 
responsibility and should refuse to fight unjust wars or, at least, not re-enlist for them.  
The just war principles are quite broad and general, and contemporary just war theorists offer slightly 
different sets of principles, interpret the individual principles in dissimilar ways, and give different weight 
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to the various principles. Thus just war theorists end up defending views that range from being rather 
bellicose and generally supportive of US interventionist policies, to views that are in practice close to 
pacifism and oppose most, if not all, recent US wars. Still, just war theory provides a widely shared moral 
framework for addressing new moral concerns raised by the ever-changing nature of warfare. This seems 
particularly important when the United Nations (UN) Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
(which embody many just war principles) may not cover new military developments and threats, such as 
targeted killing by drones in response to the dangers posed by “global terrorism.” Thus the moral analysis 
offered by just war theory may lead to a desire to revise the UN Charter and IHL, or may lead one to 
argue against misguided efforts in that direction. 
DRONE WARFARE AND JUS AD BELLUM 
In a speech at the National Defense University on May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama defended the 
targeted killings under his administration as morally and legally justified acts of war, as a part of a war of 
self-defense against al-Qaeda and its “associated forces” authorized by Congress in response to 9/11 in 
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).4 No doubt, in light of the scope and nature of the 
targeted killings executed under his authority, Obama rightly viewed them as acts of war rather than, say, 
as last-resort acts of law enforcement. But were they justified acts of war? Did they have a just cause? 
More specifically, the question is whether the “militants” targeted by the Obama administration’s drone 
killings constituted a clear threat against the United States of a magnitude and type such that war acts 
against them were warranted. Jeff McMahan argues that the targeted killing of terrorists who plan attacks 
is morally quite similar to the killing of aggressor combatants who are asleep.5 Aggressor combatants 
(who are in uniform) have a legal right to kill just combatants on the battlefield, while civilian aggressors 
lack the legal right to kill their intended targets. But both lack a moral right to kill since they both intend 
to be instrumental in killing persons who have done nothing to warrant this fate. We may therefore kill 
both types of aggressors in order to prevent wrongful harm from being inflicted.  
This analysis provides moral support for targeted killing as an act of war only in terms of the type of 
threat that is posed. What is also required for “just cause” is that the threat has a magnitude large 
enough so that war becomes a reasonable option. After all, a limited threat does not justify the initiation 
of war with all its inevitable, and often unexpected, harms. (The proportionality principle further assesses 
whether the benefits of eliminating the threat embedded in the just cause outweigh the anticipated harms 
of this course of action; the just cause principle only requires the existence of a threat that meets the 
threshold of a serious threat.)  
Moreover, it is only when the threat to a political community is very substantive that we may adopt 
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the morally deeply-disconcerting war standard of killing on the basis of hostile status (as happens in drone 
strikes) in addition to the commonly accepted standard of killing in strict self-defense. Similarly, the threat 
must be great to warrant the adoption of a less strict standard in war than in law enforcement for 
avoiding the unintentional killing of non-hostile civilians. Typically, terrorists lack the weaponry, the 
organization, and the number of participants for meeting the threat threshold of just cause, and in that 
case civilian aggressors should be approached as very dangerous criminals who should be arrested, 
extradited if needed, and who may only be killed or incapacitated when they use lethal force or seek to 
escape. The horrific events of 9/11, however, gave credibility to the idea that al-Qaeda posed a danger 
that went above the threshold necessary for war. To be sure, the virtually unanimous support for war at 
the time might have been rooted more in retributive feelings than in the conviction that war was 
necessary to prevent large-scale future harms. But this only shows that the understanding of war as 
punishment, rejected by most modern just war theorists, is still prevalent. Credible just war thinking must 
see war as not only in need of justification at the point of its initiation, but should also assess its 
continuation and its various stages on the basis of jus ad bellum principles (i.e., we should temporalize the 
principles).6 The Bush administration initiated a conflict in Pakistan (beyond the conflict in Afghanistan) 
with the targeted killing of civilian “militants” in the FATA. Obama stepped up these killings after his 
inauguration in 2009: while 51 strikes took place under Bush, beginning in 2004 and peaking in 2008 with 
38 strikes, under Obama 52 strikes took place in 2009 and 128 strikes in 2010 (and as of September 1, 
2016, 373 of 424 strikes have been under Obama).7 Did this new campaign have a just cause? By 2009, 
the case that al-Qaeda constituted a threat serious enough to qualify as a just cause had greatly 
weakened. No major attacks had been launched or plotted against the United States after 9/11 that gave 
credibility to the view that law-enforcement measures would be largely inadequate to meet future al-
Qaeda threats. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan had weakened al-Qaeda in this region and led to its 
dispersal to other countries. It may also be noted that other countries that suffered from horrendous 
terrorist attacks in the years after 2001, such as Indonesia (Bali bombing in 2002) and Spain (Madrid 
bombing in 2004), had not moved away from the law-enforcement model.  
Prior to Obama's speech in 2013, his administration never really tried to make the case that its drone 
killings in Pakistan were justified in terms of self-defense, since it executed these killings largely in 
secrecy. Until very recently, the only data available about the number of strikes and people killed have 
been tabulated by civilian groups, based on reports by local individuals, government officials, and 
journalists in a region with rather limited access. This lack of transparency violates the requirements of 
the principle of legitimate authority. Congress failed in its responsibility as legitimate authority when it 
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authorized the president, in the AUMF, to use US armed forces against any state, organization, or person 
linked to 9/11. Obama exploited this extremely open-ended authorization in his approval of greatly 
expanding US targeted killing in Pakistan, sidestepping the fact that the CIA is not part of the “armed 
forces.” It should also be noted that the AUMF only authorized the president to take action against people 
connected to 9/11, not those suspected of other terrorist actions. The principle of legitimate authority 
demands full transparency (rather than limited reporting to some members of Congress) because it is only 
on the basis of debate and access to all facts that a body representing the people can declare war, as a 
communal enterprise, in the name of the people. The same can be said of new stages of development in 
a continuing war. Remarkably, it was not until early 2012 that Obama for the first time publicly discussed 
his drone program, and only on July 1, 2016, did his administration for the first time disclose strike and 
casualty figures of its drone wars outside declared battle zones.8 
Secrecy also enabled the Obama administration to violate the principle of right intention in its targeted 
killing campaign in Pakistan. Even though the killings were justified as self-defense in Obama's 2013 
speech, they must have served other goals. Notably, from 2009 to October 2014 under 4 percent of those 
killed and named were al-Qaeda members and around 5 percent were senior commanders of militant 
groups in general, while less than 10 percent of all strikes in Pakistan under Obama have been confirmed 
as directed against al-Qaeda.9 In short, it seems that the militants killed were mostly low-level insurgents 
with local aims (such as members of the Pakistan Taliban), and most strikes were not in fact aimed at 
named "high value" individuals (so-called personality strikes) but rather at individuals who fit the profile of 
a militant (so-called signature strikes). The US goals (other than self-defense) seem to have been to 
weaken the FATA as a basis of support for the Afghanistan Taliban and to assist the Pakistani government 
in its struggle with various armed opposition groups, such as the Pakistan Taliban. More broadly, the 
United States seems to have been guided by the motive of maintaining, and even extending, its role as 
global military hegemon. I will later suggest that the United States morally erred in pursuing these goals; 
what matters now is to note that the goals show a lack of “right intention” behind the Obama 
administration’s drone killings.  
 The various violations of the first three jus ad bellum principles by the targeted killings in Pakistan 
point to several moral dangers of drone warfare. Since drone warfare poses few risks for its executioners, 
it is easy for political leaders to order drone strikes without seeking public support and for the purpose of 
preventing threats that remain under the threshold of just cause. Moreover, drone warfare makes it easy 
to pursue goals that are different from the stated goal of national security that generally appeals to the 
public. Accordingly, drone warfare seems to be thus far the best enabler of war as “alienated war,” that is, 
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war as a collective activity that no longer requires public sacrifice and moral commitment.10 The volunteer 
army, the use of private military contractors, the technology of precision bombs, and, now, drone warfare, 
are all steps toward normalizing war for US citizens: war no longer feels like war, it no longer disrupts 
everyday life, and, so, war becomes acceptable. Long-term “boots on the ground,” even if they are the 
boots of volunteers, threatens this normalization, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, but 
there is no such time-limit problem in drone warfare. Combat drones also have been proven to be very 
effective in conventional wars, as illustrated by the war in Libya. No troops on the ground were necessary 
for “success” in that war, and this played a role in President Obama simply announcing this war, rather 
than seeking public approval and congressional authorization. Drone warfare, then, as almost risk-free war 
for US soldiers, minimizes the number of occasions that the public is left wondering whether war and the 
United States playing “global cop” is worth the sacrifices of its soldiers. With drone warfare, the danger is 
that the public is left free to admire the military in a cultural sort of way only (video games, technological 
awe, “support the troops,” etc.), while the government is left free to pursue its political and military 
interests.  
 Granted, in response to political pressure and the persistent protest of human rights groups, the 
Obama administration made its targeted killing program a bit more transparent and accountable by 
releasing concomitant with the President's 2013 speech a fact sheet outlining standards taken from a 
classified Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), for determining kill decisions against terrorists outside war 
zones.11 However,  the standards obfuscate the program because, as I will show below, they largely 
mismatch with how most actual strikes have taken place. Similarly, Obama's release in 2016 of the strike 
and casualty figures of his covert drone wars is hardly a real victory for government transparency and 
accountability since the figures lack any specific supportive data and grossly understate the civilian 
casualties. Still, it is some progress that an accompanying executive order promises yearly reports from 
now on.12 Lastly, the classified PPG was disclosed on August 5, 2016 through a court-enforced Freedom of 
Information request by the ACLU, adding some details to the killing procedures outlined in 2013.13 All in all, 
we may see these developments as small steps forward in terms of government transparency and 
accountability, but it also should be noted that none of the measures has binding legal force on future 
administrations and the "rules" may be set aside by "executive order" of the president, now or in the 
future. 
 Drone warfare shields the US public from the reality of war, but war is still very real at the 
receiving end. For many years in the FATA, the buzz of combat drones was heard regularly overhead for 
hours on end, leaving the local people in an enduring state of fear since the missiles could strike at any 
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moment. And the strikes caused human devastation: from 2004 onwards between 2,499 and 4001 people 
were killed; the non-hostile civilian death tally is between 424 and 966, including as many as 207 children. 
Another 1,161 to 1,744 people have been injured.14 
Other costs of the drone strikes were that Pakistan’s sovereignty has been violated and that the strikes 
have led to growing resentment among the Pakistani people against the United States. Moreover, the 
strikes created fertile recruiting grounds in the FATA for new civilian aggressors and set a bad precedent 
for future targeted killing campaigns by other countries. It seems that all these costs could reasonably 
have been foreseen when the drone campaign in Pakistan was expanded in 2009, and so it should have 
been clear to the Obama administration that the campaign, with its uncertain and limited threat 
prevention impact, would violate the proportionality principle. And, surely, the more these costs have 
become impossible to ignore in subsequent years, the stronger the case has become in terms of 
proportionality considerations that the campaign has to stop. 
The Obama administration, however, claimed that its drone strikes did not violate Pakistan’s 
sovereignty because that government permitted the strikes. This defense has merit but is ultimately not 
fully convincing. A visible sign of Pakistan’s permission, at least in the early years of the Obama drone 
attacks, is that the CIA launched drones not only from Afghanistan but also from Shamsi air base in 
Pakistan (the United States was evicted from the base in December 2011). Similarly, we may see the fact 
that the Pakistani government claimed responsibility for some drone strikes prior to 2008 as reflective of 
its permission.15 We should ask, though, how did Pakistan’s permission came about? Was it the result of 
undue political pressure and conditional financial and military aid promised by the United States, or was it 
significantly the outcome of the Pakistani government’s desire to combat (with US assistance) the growing 
oppositional violence and flagrant human rights violations by the Pakistan Taliban and other militant 
groups in the FATA? Similarly, it is unclear what we should make of the Pakistani government’s frequent 
public protests against the US drone strikes. Did the protests reflect genuine concerns about violations of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty, or were they mostly attempts to pacify the growing strong public opposition 
among the Pakistani people to the strikes? So, at least, the claim that the United States did not violate the 
sovereignty of the Pakistani government (state) is questionable.  
But the real issue at stake is sovereignty in a broader sense, the sovereignty of the people of Pakistan, 
and here the picture is much clearer: the Pakistani people have frequently demonstrated against the 
drone strikes and opinion polls show consistent disapproval by the majority.16 The obvious lesson is that 
most Pakistanis thought (and still think) that oppositional violence in their country is their battle to fight, 
and for good reason. US intervention has served as a destabilizing force and even might have fueled the 
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flames of the violent opposition, exploiting anger at the “untouchability” of US military force and its 
arrogance of engaging in widespread killing in “secret.” Likewise, the United States had no right to extend 
its war in Afghanistan to Pakistan in order to address its failure to prevent al-Qaeda and many Afghanistan 
Taliban fighters from making the FATA their new staging ground after the war was “won” in Afghanistan.  
The Obama administration’s drone killings violate the last resort principle. Alternatives, whether in the 
form of negotiations or law-enforcement measures, do not seem to have been considered. In fact, a 
remarkable feature of the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy is that no prisoners are taken, 
and thus the problem so central to the Bush administration of how to treat captured suspected terrorists is 
largely avoided. It is certainly ironic that in the same year Obama reached out to the Islamic world and 
received the Nobel Peace Prize, he also greatly stepped up the drone strikes in Pakistan. The brief hope 
for a more multilateral and cooperative American foreign policy was betrayed in secret by a continuation 
of the usual militarized foreign policy, clouding the prospect of finding enduring solutions for terrorism. 
Thus the principle of reasonable chance of success was also violated, because military force in accordance 
with this principle must lead to long-term threat reduction. The drone strikes might have reduced some 
threats posed by al-Qaeda for the United States, but at the cost of worsening the economic and political 
conditions in the FATA and so inducing new threats in the long run, especially for the Pakistani people. 
Generally, militarized foreign policy errs in thinking that war is the answer; it fails to recognize that 
military force, at best, can bring people to the point of renewing cooperative efforts and finding 
nonviolent, enduring solutions for what gave rise to violent conflict in the first place.  
It could be argued that the Obama administration's scaling down of its drone strikes after 2014 shows 
that the campaign had largely met its stated and unstated objectives. This inference is misleading and 
erroneous. What seems to have been behind the reduced strikes is that the Pakistani army, after failed 
peace negotiations with the Taliban, undertook in June 2014 a renewed military offensive against the 
militant groups in the FATA and continued this throughout 2015. That offensive significantly weakened 
these groups and created massive displacement among the people caught in the middle. Also, the United 
States has limited drone capabilities, and more drones were needed in Afghanistan (to counter the impact 
of reduced troop presence after the official end of the NATO combat mission in 2014), as well as in Iraq 
and Syria in order to combat ISIS In addition, the negative publicity created when a signature drone strike 
in January 2015 in Pakistan killed an American citizen and an Italian citizen held by al-Qaeda may have 
played a role.17  
The violations of the final three jus ad bellum principles further underline how drone warfare enables 
“alienated” war. Since targeted killing by drones does not place US soldiers in the areas under attack, it 
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seems that sovereignty is not violated and that no war has been waged against the Pakistani people. In 
other words, drone strikes appear to eliminate only “terrorists” from afar. Drones, commonly touted as 
very precise weapons, reportedly excise this evil. This mode of thought has prevented placing the harm 
caused by drones to the Pakistani people at the center of US national discourse, and there have been no 
US soldiers on the ground to report stories of great human suffering. Our news about drones at war is 
not the news of a country at war. “Alienated” war is war for which people do not take full responsibility, 
and combat drones facilitate this denial of responsibility.  
DRONE WARFARE AND JUS IN BELLO 
Granted that the Obama drone campaign in Pakistan was unjust in jus ad bellum terms, it follows that 
all US drone killings during this campaign were wrongful killings, and that the just course of action 
would have been to request Pakistan to arrest all those civilian militants against whom US courts would 
have a legal case. No doubt, this would have been a tall order and success might have been limited, 
even if the Pakistani government would have accepted US assistance. But justice comes with a price, 
and the moral costs of drone killings as the alternative were much greater. Still, it remains important to 
address the wrongful drone killings in jus in bello terms, both in order to rebut the Obama 
administration’s view that the drone strikes were justly executed and to point out jus in bello moral 
dangers of drone warfare in general.  
The United States has frequently executed several missile strikes in short succession on the same 
target in Pakistan with the result that responders to the first strike, such as rescue workers and family 
members, were killed.18 This policy violates the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity 
because it reflects lack of due care in seeking to minimize civilian casualties; worse even, it suggests the 
intentional killing of civilians, a war crime. Besides requiring due care, the principle of discrimination also 
demands that the civilian costs of individual strikes are not excessive in light of the military value of the 
strikes. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) reports that the number of civilians killed was 
minimally 100 in 2009, 89 in 2010, 52 in 2011, 13 in 2012, as low as 0 in 2013 and 2014, 2 in 2015, and 1 
in 2016. The civilians killed in each year were, respectively, approximately 22, 11, 14, 7, 0, 0, 3, and 9 
percent of the total killed 19 Is this range of killing civilians proportionate?  
Prior to addressing this question, two things should be noted. First, the Obama administration has 
claimed that its drone strikes in non-war zones killed 64 to 116 civilians from 2009 through 2015.20 The 
BIJ reports around 250 to 520 civilians killed during this period in Pakistan alone, with at least dozens 
more killed in Yemen and Somalia.21 The BIJ numbers are the only tallies that offer figures year by year 
with a record of each individual strike. On the other hand, the Obama administration has a clear interest 
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in saving face after repeatedly claiming during the last four years that drones are "very precise." Second, 
aggregate data may be helpful to assess whether a military campaign in its totality upholds the principle 
of discrimination, but in the field each military strike should be assessed.  
A recent defender of the drone campaign in Pakistan argues that we can judge whether this campaign 
was proportionate by “compar[ing] the number of civilians that targets are killing and the number of 
civilians killed in the targeting to see which number is bigger.” Noting that al-Qaeda (and its affiliates) had 
been responsible for over 4,400 civilian deaths throughout the years and that at most 700 civilians had 
been killed in Pakistan through 2011, this supporter of drone strikes concludes that the civilian deaths in 
Pakistan were clearly not excessive.22 I have already pointed out the flaw in this reasoning: the total 
number of civilians killed by al-Qaeda is as such not an adequate reflection of the threat level posed by 
this group in 2009 when Obama stepped up the drone war. Arguably, the same was true in 2004 when 
Bush initiated the drone campaign. Certainly, there is no evidence to support the notion that the drone 
campaign against al-Qaeda has saved the lives of even remotely as many US civilians as the number of 
Pakistani civilians killed during this campaign. Proportionality seems to demand that the estimated number 
of saved lives should be much higher.23 
Another argument to the effect that the civilian-killing percentage of the drone warfare in Pakistan 
was acceptable is that alternative military strategies, such as putting boots on the ground, would have 
led to greater numbers of civilians killed.24 Generally, it might be true that non-drone counterterrorism 
operations may result in more civilian deaths—soldiers, for example, may be more discriminate than 
drones (they know who shoots at them), but more civilians might be caught in crossfire in a ground 
battle. But one cannot conclude that since one operational strategy brings fewer civilian deaths than 
another that, therefore, this strategy has an acceptable rate of civilian deaths. After all, the other 
strategy might be grossly disproportionate. At best, the comparative proportionality advantage of drone 
warfare helps to explain why drone warfare is a preferred US option. It also might be a factor in the 
United States opting for drone warfare in regions where it would not use traditional conventional military 
force.  
The claims made by Obama and various officials of his administration to the effect that combat 
drones are very accurate or precise weapons are misleading. The very fact that drone technology has 
accurate capabilities in terms of identifying its target and then striking the target with a limited blast area 
does not mean that due care is taken to avoid civilian casualties. The fact that the number of civilian 
casualties decreased greatly after 2012, when the drone warfare in Pakistan came under increased public 
scrutiny and criticism, suggests that the reported technological accuracy in the early years of the Obama 
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drone campaign in Pakistan went hand in hand with a lack of “moral accuracy.” Relatedly, precision in 
finding and hitting the target does not imply that there is precision in the selection of the target.25 
One problem with the selection of targets is flawed intelligence, leading to misidentification of civilians 
as hostile militants. Another problem is that there is no general agreement on the criteria for determining 
the hostile status of civilians in the first place. The bomb maker of al-Qaeda is a threat, but what about 
the propaganda maker, the paid armed chauffeur, or a seemingly inactive member? The little we know 
about the identities of “militants” killed by the Obama administration suggests that it adheres to a rather 
broad understanding of what counts as being militant. Signature strikes, with their vague killing standard 
of “fitting the profile of hostile militants,” add greatly to the problem that many people killed might have 
been misidentified or mischaracterized. Even the data gathered by various civilian groups might over-
report the number of genuine militants, since often the only evidence for claiming that the casualties were 
militants is the reporting by “anonymous Pakistani officials,” presumably army officials with an interest in 
having broad standards of militancy and pleasing the US military.26 Thus the unintended civilian deaths of 
the drone campaign in Pakistan might be considerably greater than the mere numbers or percentages of 
“civilians killed” suggest, so that we cannot rule out the possibility that even in its later years the 
campaign might have been to some degree disproportionate.  
The principle of micro-proportionality prohibits excessive use of force, taking into consideration both 
civilian and militant casualties. Based on the assumption that the goal of the drone campaign in Pakistan 
was to eliminate threats posed by al-Qaeda, signature strikes violate this principle because there was no 
way of telling whether an individual who fit the profile of “militant” belonged to al-Qaeda or some other 
militant group. Moreover, since, as previously noted, less than 10 percent of all drone strikes in Pakistan 
(during the Obama administration) were in fact specifically directed against al-Qaeda, military force was 
used excessively in terms of the stated goal of combatting “global terrorism” because no attempt was 
made to avoid the killing of militants with local aims only, and their deaths had only marginal value with 
respect to the goal of weakening al-Qaeda.  
In sum, all the praise of combat drones as very precise killing machines obscures difficult moral 
problems of setting (and executing) morally convincing standards for determining the hostile status of 
civilians and of deciding what counts as disproportionate civilian deaths. Similar problems also emerge 
with regard to defining military targets in civilian settings. Technological accuracy lulls people into thinking 
that “moral accuracy” has been reached, making drone warfare a more acceptable form of warfare. What 
further enables the comfort of drone warfare as “alienated war” is that US military superiority leaves 
people unconcerned that drone warfare brings war home in a manner that raises significant jus in bello 
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concerns: military drone pilots are combatants during their working hours on their base and they “hide” 
their combatant status after work when they mix into the civilian population and return home. Moreover, 
the CIA agents who assist in drone strikes are civilians who help to kill civilian militants who are blamed 
for hiding their hostile intentions.27 
TARGETED KILLING: BETWEEN WAR AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In his speech at the National Defense University, Obama not only defended his drone warfare record, but 
he also looked at the future of the war against global terrorism. He said: “America is at a crossroads. (…) 
We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that ‘No nation could preserve its freedom in the 
midst of continual warfare.’” More specifically, Obama reiterated his commitment to bring the troops home 
from Afghanistan and proposed that we no longer define US counterterrorism as a “global war on terror,” 
but rather “as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists 
that threaten America.” These “targeted efforts” foremost refer to drone strikes, and, so , Obama 
suggests  that the continuation of targeted killing strikes, at a reduced rate thanks to “the progress we’ve 
made against core al-Qaeda,” is no longer really war. Correspondingly, he said that he would like 
Congress and the American people to engage “in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s 
mandate.”  
The fact sheet released by the White House simultaneously with Obama's speech lists the standards  
for using lethal counterterrorism force in non-war zones. In short, the standards  permit a drone attack 
against a terrorist only if capture is not feasible, local authorities will not or cannot take effective 
measures to deal with the “imminent threat to U.S. persons,” and there is “near certainty that the terrorist 
target is present” and “near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed.” The “fact sheet” 
maintains that the standards “are either already in place or will be transitioned into place.” 
What are we to make of these standards and the proclaimed “end” of the war on terror? It is clear 
that the Obama administration has mostly ignored its own standards. Killings are not limited to persons 
posing an imminent threat to Americans, no attempt is made to capture suspected terrorists, and local 
authorities are apparently not asked to deal first with the alleged threats. Only the standard of preventing 
non-combatant deaths might have had some impact because there has been a reduction in civilian 
casualties since the Obama administration first divulged the PPG standards. Also, the "end" of the war on 
terror has been delayed with the emergence of ISIS, and the Obama administration views the fight 
against ISIS as justified under the 2001 AUMF. Still, Obama's remarks here are instructive for the future of 
counterterrorism. By suggesting that the continuation of drone killings of civilian militants is not a 
continuation of the “war on terror” and can be done with a refinement or even repeal of the AUMF, 
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Obama seems to want the American public to accept the idea of permanent military counterterrorism that 
is no longer called "war." What his administration also seems to be doing is to push targeted killings by 
drones in the direction of a hybrid model of the war and law-enforcement legal models of the use of force, 
following the example of the Bush administration’s hybrid treatment of captured terrorists. Targeted killing 
by drones involves the use of force typical of war -- hostile status killing. But by stating that only persons 
who are an "imminent threat" are killed, and they would have been captured if feasible, targeted killing 
fits into the law-enforcement model. Thus Obama is articulating a hybrid model (of war and law 
enforcement). Some just war theorists have favored such a model -- in the hope of giving greater 
respectability to US targeted killing by drones, avoiding censure that might come from either the war 
model or law-enforcement model of the use of force.28 Further, combat drones, it is widely admitted, do 
not meet legal obstacles as such when used in conventional war theaters. Thus, we would be led toward a 
world in which drone warfare would be the new legal “normal,” both in international conflicts and armed 
conflicts with non-state actors. Would a just military and society want such a world? 
COMBAT DRONES, KILLER ROBOTS, AND JUS ANTE BELLUM 
Just war theorists tend to look at each war as a separate moral event, paying little attention to the fact 
that how we prepare for war has a great impact on how likely it is that war will be justly initiated and 
executed. To address this shortcoming I have articulated in some prior essays a new category of just war 
thinking, “just military preparedness,” with principles that set forth requirements for the military as a just 
institution.29 In line with the commonly used naming of the other just war theory categories, the new 
category may be called  jus ante bellum.  Just military preparedness addresses two justice concerns. First, 
it raises questions about whether the military preparation of a country is just toward its military personnel, 
places a fair burden on the civilian population, and the like. Second, it raises questions about whether the 
military preparation of a country is such that it is conducive to the country resorting to force only when 
justice is on its side and to executing war justly. The ultimate concern of jus ante bellum as part of just 
war theory is military preparedness that is just in the second sense, but justice in the first sense must also 
be addressed since it impacts the possibility of justice in the second sense. In what follows, I will discuss 
five jus ante bellum principles, emphasizing the first two principles since they have the greatest bearing 
on the question of whether a just military would want to include combat drones in its preparation for the 
possibility of war.  
The first principle says that the basic defense structure of a country should accord with its general 
purpose of using military force only for the sake of protecting people against extensive basic human rights 
violations caused by large-scale armed violence. This principle of “just purpose” requires that a country is  
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able to meet acts of aggression and has the capacity to contribute to the collective tasks of assisting other 
countries in their self-defense and preventing humanitarian catastrophes caused by armed force 
(humanitarian intervention). The United States, with its relentless pursuit of military superiority, its 
professional army of around 1.3 million active duty personnel (and 0.8 million reserve forces), its “empire 
of bases,” and its military expenditures close to 40 percent of global military spending is in clear violation 
of this principle. The US military does not seek capability of self-defense and global security through 
collective efforts, but rather aims at military hegemony and global “power” projection to serve its political 
and economic needs. 
The first principle requires that new military technology is introduced only if it is necessary for, or 
conducive to, the global protection of basic human rights. In the past, new military technology has often 
been developed by a party in order to gain advantage in a conflict that otherwise could not have been 
won or only won at very great human costs. But this does not describe how during the past few decades 
the United States has introduced new military technology. The main motivations behind its continuous 
military technological innovations seem to be the desire to maintain military superiority and dominance 
and to satisfy huge financial interests at stake in the research, development, production, and sale of new 
weapons. The introduction of combat drones illustrates this point. Drone warfare extends the global reach 
of US military power, and currently the military spends around 5 billion per year on unmanned systems 
which includes growing budgets set aside for developing new systems.30 Now the problem with new 
military technologies is that they tend to spread to other countries, and this is certainly happening with 
combat drones. Major military powers such as China, Israel, and the U.K. have acquired drones, as have 
some smaller powers such as Nigeria and South Africa.31 Congress has approved the sales of combat 
drones to allies and many countries are seeking to acquire drones. A world of increased use of drones in 
war and non-war zones (many countries have their own "terrorists" or militants seeking succession) is an 
increasingly destabilized world. Hamas and Hezbollah have used quite primitive drones. Nonstate actors 
acquiring more sophisticated drones greatly adds to the problem. So, had the US military been just in 
terms of military preparedness, it would not have introduced combat drones. 
Some recent defenders of combat drones have argued that they are beneficial for protecting human 
rights. The basic argument is that countries such as the United States with a low tolerance for casualties 
among its troops might use drones to execute humanitarian interventions it would otherwise not have 
executed for being too risky to the troops.32 Here the argument that combat drones make war too easy is 
turned around: it is a good thing that it becomes easier to intervene in unfolding humanitarian crises. And  
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the punch line is that “humanitarian drones” were already very effective in the “humanitarian intervention” 
in Libya, and that future “ground drones” (remote-controlled mobile strike platforms) would be of even 
greater assistance in meeting humanitarian goals.33 
One problem with this argument is that most of what happened in Libya was not a humanitarian 
intervention in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973,34 but rather NATO choosing a side 
in a civil war and actively supporting the overthrow of Qaddafi. Another problem is that it is unclear how 
combat drones could effectively protect populations under threat and actually stop génocidaires in their 
tracks. What seems more plausible is that killing from above would fan the flames on the killing fields. 
Similarly, drones on the ground would not seem particularly effective in defusing human hatred in action. 
A much better alternative is to create a permanent rapid intervention force under UN authority, specially 
trained for peacekeeping and dealing with violent humanitarian conflicts and composed of soldiers from 
across the globe. This would avoid reinforcing the role of the United States as military hegemon and it 
would make addressing humanitarian crises a collective responsibility, not requiring US soldiers alone to 
risk their lives.  
Combat drones are quite vulnerable to attack from modern air-defense systems, and so the United 
States is developing stealth drones and drones with air-to-air attack abilities. Especially noteworthy is the 
stealth X-47B with its ability to land and take off from aircraft carriers and refuel in the air. It has a much 
larger flying range than current weaponized UAVs and it can fly itself. So the future seems to be that US 
combat drones will be used in more conflicts, will begin to replace even the most advanced manned 
aircrafts, and can reach all the corners of the world. Also, the X-47B points to a future where the human 
role is limited to overriding the decisions of unmanned killing systems, as a step toward fully autonomous 
systems where humans are taken out of the loop altogether, and the killer robots “select” their own 
targets and “decide” on their own when to pull the trigger. Generally, drone pilots and sensors have 
limitations of concentration, duration, and processing data, and so there is a push toward taking them out 
of the loop or at least limiting their role. Other drones in various stages of development include micro UAV 
killer drones, drones operating in swarms (LOCUST program), and weaponized underwater unmanned 
vehicles (UUVs).  
The move toward autonomous lethal systems, or “killer robots,” in the air, on the ground, or undersea 
will further increase some of the moral dangers noted with regard to remote-control killing. The threshold 
for resorting to force will be further lowered because the risks to soldiers will be further minimized. The 
illusion that borders can be crossed without violation of sovereignty will become even more compelling,  
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and political leaders will be even less inclined to seek public authorization for war. Robotic warfare is also 
likely to strengthen war as alienated war for those who have the robots on their side. Robots seem to 
promise security without human costs; no tears need be shed over fallen robots. But, here again, we must 
wonder what would happen if other countries catch up with the United States, or even surpass it in killer 
robot innovations. Robotic killers have neither loyalty nor mercy and will kill for all who can afford them, 
the just and unjust alike, including non-state actors. Their presence will be a great threat to human rights 
unless one assumes that in the future all centers of political and economic power somehow miraculously 
coalesce with all the centers of justice, leaving robots only to fight unjust militants at the periphery. More 
likely, it will be a world of extreme asymmetric warfare, in which robots fight civilian militants who in some 
cases rightfully and other cases wrongfully refuse to obey the policies of the controllers of the killer 
robots. Ironically, in a world in which there is a diminishing number of human soldiers to fight, militant 
civilians might increasingly turn in desperation to attacking civilians under the protection of killer robots.  
The second jus ante bellum principle—the moral competency and autonomy principle—demands that 
military personnel be educated and trained with the just purpose of resort to force (articulated in the first 
principle) in mind, and be treated as morally competent and autonomous agents. Part of the rationale of 
this principle is that it is deeply immoral to turn soldiers into mere instruments of the state, deny them the 
opportunity to exercise their jus ad bellum responsibility, and let them pay the moral and psychological 
costs of coming to reject a war through the experience of fighting the war. All too often soldiers come to 
regret their participation in war. Yet, it does not seem to be the case that the US military is encouraging 
any independent jus ad bellum thinking among its troops or even officers.35 The second principle further 
requires that combatants are trained to become experts in protecting human rights, and this includes, but 
is not limited to, taking on jus in bello responsibility. The US military is somewhat more successful in 
training its soldiers in jus in bello responsibility, partly because the changed nature of warfare. 
Counterinsurgency by US ground troops in Iraq. and especially Afghanistan, necessitated better training in 
this regard: military success requires winning the hearts and minds of local civilian populations. 
Nevertheless, there are many documented instances of the commission of war crimes by US forces.36 
Drone warfare is likely to have some eroding impact on soldiers taking on jus ad bellum responsibility 
and strictly adhering to jus in bello norms. The justice of their war should be of equal concern to remote-
control soldiers and soldiers on the physical battlefield. But remote-control soldiers have a reduced 
incentive to ponder the issue since they are not risking their lives as are the traditional soldiers. Moreover, 
since drone operators are not directly experiencing the consequences of their actions, they are less likely 
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to come to question whether justice is indeed on their side. Also, unlike traditional soldiers, drone soldiers 
cannot get feedback from enemy soldiers or local civilians that might lead them to address jus ad bellum 
issues.  
With regard to jus in bello norms, killing in a remote-controlled way seems to invite less due care in 
trying to avoid violating these norms, as might be done by protesting or refusing immoral orders, because 
one can experience the harm that one has caused only in a mediated way. Granted, remote-control killers, 
like killers on the physical battlefield, see the harm they have caused—and PTSD has been reported 
among drone operators.37 But it is also the case that the drone killers are only watching a monitor, that 
they watch without being seen, that they do not hear the sounds of suffering, and that they watch with 
others, and all these features seem to create emotional distance and with it moral distance and greater 
risk of moral indifference.38 What seems to add to the unreality of the harm and the risk of moral sliding is 
that the mediated battlefield experience is an interruption of everyday life with family, driving to and from 
work, and so on.  
Even if one were to conclude that drone warfare as such is not likely to have some erosive moral 
impact on a military that seeks to adhere to moral standards, there is still the problem that effective drone 
operators may simply be skilled gamers who think flying a drone is a cool video game. The drone soldiers 
do not need courage; they do not need to feel a loyalty to fellow soldiers or country that requires them to 
be prepared to risk their lives; they do not have to face their victims and confront the fact that the video 
game is not really a game; and they do not even have to be paid very well (say, as compared to 
mercenaries, who risk their lives but fight without political allegiance). In short, drone warfare enables 
war to be partly executed by human agents who are the very opposite of the human agents who may 
justifiably use force according to the second jus ante bellum principle: agents committed to protecting 
human rights and using force only for the sake of this purpose. For a just military, the fact that flying 
drones might be outsourced to skilled gamers with no concern for protecting human rights would be an 
additional reason not to embrace drone warfare.  
Combat drones operative in war zones do not seem to pose direct moral problems for soldiers on the 
ground as long as a clear command structure is in place. However, once drones morph into autonomous 
lethal systems, this will change. When human soldiers and killer robots fight side by side, the robots will 
place significant limits on the scope of decision making of human soldiers, and the human soldiers may be 
helpless to prevent situations when robots malfunction, misjudge a threat, use excessive force, or violate 
the laws of war. And, these jus in bello violations may also emerge when robots fight on their own in both 
war and non-war zones. Proponents of fully autonomous killing systems have argued that such problems 
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can be circumvented by designing killer robots so that jus in bello constraints are integrated into their 
artificial intelligence. Even better, they argue, killer robots lack emotions of anger and hatred that may 
lead human soldiers to commit jus in bello crimes. In response, it should be noted that it is doubtful that 
machines will any time soon, if ever, have the capacity to act in accordance with the laws of war, and so 
there is the definite danger that killer robots will be developed and used that fall significantly short in this 
regard. Moreover, why should we assume that all militaries would even want to build these constraints 
into their killer robots? To be sure, unjust militaries may also use and train rogue soldiers, but unlike 
rogue killer robots, most human killers have some emotive resistance to killing that may at least offer 
some protection for non-hostile civilians, surrendering combatants, and the like.39  
 The third principle of just military preparedness—the principle of priority to nonviolence—demands 
that preference be given to nonmilitary means of preventing extensive basic human rights violations 
caused by armed force. In theory, the Obama administration seems to agree with this principle and the 
criticism it implies with regard to US military preparation. In his speech at the National Defense University, 
Obama said: “[F]oreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security. 
And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance 
is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent.”40 In 
practice, however, the Obama administration has done little to bring US military preparation closer to 
satisfying the third jus ante bellum principle. The State Department/USAID budget, which also includes 
billions of dollars in military assistance, has been flat under the Obama administration after significant 
increases during the Bush administration, and has been consistently less than 10 percent of the 
Department of Defense budget (which in itself is considerably less than total US military spending). In 
short, the Obama administration’s foreign policy is thoroughly militarized, and this supports my earlier 
argument that it is implausible to see the drone warfare in Pakistan as satisfying the jus ad bellum 
principle of last resort. More broadly, as long as the United States spends so little on foreign aid, 
diplomacy, peace education, arms control, refugee assistance, and the numerous nonmilitary programs of 
the United Nations as compared to its military spending, we have good reason to doubt that any future US 
war will satisfy the principle of last resort. 
The fourth jus ante bellum principle—the principle of proper balance of values and resource 
allocation—requires that the value of security (against the threat of widespread basic human rights 
violations by armed force) and the resources committed to this value are carefully balanced against other 
values that good government should promote (e.g., education and health) and the resources set aside for 
their realization. US governments after World War II have consistently violated this principle by 
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disproportionate military spending, and one enabling factor has been to stoke the flames of fear, from 
exaggerating the threat of communism to exaggerating the threat of terrorism. Surely, if, say, 50 percent 
of the money spent on the war on terrorism would have been spent on improving traffic safety, preventive 
health care, cancer research, and a cleaner environment, many more human life years in the United 
States would have been saved than this war, even on the most fantastic threat assumptions, ever could 
have prevented.41 Moreover, the money so spent would have enhanced the quality of life for millions of 
Americans. But the politics of fear sells. Politicians, the military brass, weapons producers, and many 
research scientists profit from the “military-industrial complex.” And the “empire of bases” guarantees 
access to essential material resources. All these interests are extraneous to the concern of having a 
military for protecting human rights, and they cast into doubt the jus ad bellum required “right intention” 
behind any (future) US interventions. 
Military research and development (R&D) may have significant civilian payoffs. For example, the 
civilian drone industry is booming, and the current R&D in robotic warfare systems may sooner or later 
also bring considerable civilian benefits. This very fact, however, does not mean that the typically more 
than 50 percent of the government-supported R&D spent on defense is not a violation of the fourth jus 
ante bellum principle. For one thing, the road through military R&D to various civilian applications is an 
indirect one, and so it is a road that costs much more in terms of human resources and talent than it 
would had the civilian products been pursued directly. For another thing, we cannot assume that the 
civilian payoffs of military R&D always match with items high on our civilian R&D lists. Relatedly, the 
argument that military spending is good for the economy fails. Military production comparatively creates 
few jobs, and so we would create many more employment opportunities by, say, investing in mass transit 
or installing solar panels than by manufacturing combat drones.42 
The fifth and final jus ante bellum principle—the principle of competent and right authority—demands 
that matters of military preparedness be settled by a recognized authority competent to make such 
decisions, with the right intention, aiming for just military preparedness rather than extraneous interests. In 
a democratic society, the representatives of the people should be this competent and right authority, 
requiring them to communicate openly and honestly with the citizens about the costs and benefits of 
alternative “just military preparedness” proposals. The defense budget should be transparent to the 
representatives. Guided by broad public input, they should allocate resources on the basis of careful 
balancing of the value of security against other governmental goals. Clearly, US military preparedness fails 
to satisfy these guidelines in several respects. Congressional representatives relentlessly push for military 
investments to keep jobs in their districts and please their campaign contributors, even beyond what the 
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Pentagon might want (as illustrated by the budget fight over the F-22 Raptor aircraft).43 Significant parts of 
the Pentagon budget are secret, including allocations for special operation forces. Weapons industries 
routinely have huge overruns and are a revolving door for politicians and military brass. And, the corporate 
media seldom question global US military presence. 
The introduction of drone warfare illustrates how the United States fails in terms of the competent and 
right authority principle. The first combat drone, the Predator, was developed as a surveillance system 
and used as such in the Balkan wars in the mid-1990s. After 9/11, the Bush administration authorized the 
CIA to retrofit the Predator with Hellfire missiles and kill “high-value targets” of its own choosing, and in 
early 2002 this form of warfare was first executed. In short, drone warfare became deeply embedded in 
US counterinsurgency strategy before it came to public awareness. Similarly, it is not clear how far the 
Pentagon has traveled down to the road to robotic warfare and where it actually wants to go, but at least 
public concerns are being raised now. Perhaps in response, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a 
directive on “Autonomy in Weapon Systems” on November 21, 2012.44 A somewhat positive point is that 
the directive approves only the development of fully autonomous weapon systems with nonlethal 
capabilities, but the restriction is in effect for only five years and can be waived by top officials. A clear 
negative point is that “semi-autonomous weapon systems” with lethal capabilities are fully embraced. The 
dividing line between semi- and full autonomy is that humans in semi-autonomous systems must select 
the target that the systems pursue and destroy, and this line can be easily crossed once the R&D for 
semi-autonomous weapons systems has been completed.45 Most recently, the DoD’s Defense Science 
Board recommends that "DoD must take immediate action to accelerate its exploitation of autonomy while 
also preparing to counter autonomy employed by adversaries."46 One recommendation concerns lethal 
autonomy: the experimental creation of a "minefield of autonomous lethal UUVs" (to prevent sea access).   
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
In 2009, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) called for a discussion to consider 
an international ban on autonomous weapon systems, and in 2012, Human Rights Watch actually called 
for a ban. In April 2013, Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, wrote a comprehensive report on lethal autonomous robotics (LARs). He noted, “there is 
widespread concern that allowing LARs to kill people may denigrate the value of life itself.” Heyns called 
on all countries “to declare and implement national moratoria on at least the testing, production, 
assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs until such time as an internationally agreed 
upon framework on the future of LARs has been established.”47 And also in April 2013, a broad 
international coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) launched the Campaign to Stop Killer 
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Robots. The proposal for a global ban on fully autonomous weapons is morally convincing and politically 
tenable. The moral risks involved in the use of these weapons are easy to recognize. Since the weapons 
are still in a state of development, we are not faced with the hard task of trying to turn back the clock, 
as a proposal to ban remote-controlled weaponized UAVs would imply. Indeed, the political tenability of 
“stop killer robots” is underlined by the fact that during the 2013 meeting of states party to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), it was decided to organize a four-day meeting of 
experts in May 2014 on “lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).”48 At the 2014 meeting, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Vatican called for a ban on LAWS, which U.S. officials (predictably) 
called “premature.”49 A second and third CCW on LAWS took place in 2015 and 2016, respectively, and 
nine more countries have called for a ban. The discussion continues next year.50 So should we forget 
about trying to ban our current combat drones? 
One major concern with our current combat drones is that they are a stepping stone to fully 
autonomous weapons. A ban of killer robots would take care of this concern. Another major worry is that 
our current combat drones enable targeted killing campaigns in non-war zones. These campaigns violate 
international law,51 and so we may wish to call for a stricter enforcement of international law rather than a 
campaign to stop remote-control killing by drones. Still, for three reasons, we should continue to work 
toward banning our present combat drones. First, it is the case that killing by remote control makes it too 
easy to resort to war, enables alienated war, and places too few demands on its executioners. Second, it 
is not at all clear that calling for stricter international law enforcement will be successful. International law 
is fluid and the US drone campaigns seem to gradually create their own legal norms. Third, killing by 
drones is an affront to humanity, a form of killing that we should ban on this ground alone.52 
Robert Sparrow recently noted that “there is something inherently dishonorable about killing people 
one is observing on a video screen from thousands of kilometers away and who have no opportunity to 
return fire.” He adds, “[t]his is, I think, a widespread and powerful intuition but it turns out to be 
remarkably hard to unpack.”53 I agree on both scores, but let me nonetheless try to say a few words 
about what might be behind the intuition. There are several features of drone killing that raise moral 
concerns, but these features are shared with other weapons that don’t raise the same moral recoiling. 
Drone killing is risk-free killing, but in current modern warfare this is hardly a distinctive feature of drone 
killing. Due to US military superiority, pilots of manned planes run very few risks (other than mechanical 
failings and pilot errors), and unleashing cruise missiles from a ship is also virtually risk-free. Fighters 
killed by drones have no opportunity to return fire, but this is also true for cruise missiles. Similarly, 
militants killed by drones are not given an opportunity to surrender, but again, this is also true for cruise 
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missiles. Drones have been criticized as fundamentally asymmetric weapons, giving no fighting chance to 
the enemy, but again this is not unique to drones: witness the utter destruction wrought by US aerial 
bombing campaigns. What is, however, distinctive about drones is that they are deadly surveillance 
platforms. The target is watched, sometimes for days on end, and then killed. Is it the power of being 
able to extinguish life at the moment of one’s choosing that is deeply morally disturbing here? That surely 
seems important, but the most morally disturbing feature is that in watching the militant to be killed, one 
is gradually watching a person to be killed. In other words, during the time of watching, the target turns 
from a threat into a human being, and then the kill becomes the kill of this human being. So, to come 
back to McMahan’s claim that the targeted killing of a militant is similar to killing a sleeping aggressor 
soldier, it should be noted that an attack at night when enemy soldiers are asleep might not be wrong, 
but to watch a soldier asleep for some time and experience his humanity rather than his hostile status, 
and then pull the trigger, is deeply wrong. To go after humanity instead of the threat is an affront to 
humanity, and this is what remote killing by drones often involves.54  
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